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Abstract: In labor markets for entry-level professionals and in other related markets, job
applicants' concern for availability of positions and employers' concern for availability of
qualied applicants can drive some participants on the two sides to sign early job contracts.
The rush to early contracting can be self-fullling, as both its eect on expectations about
demand-supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the eect on it from changes
in the demand-supply balance can be non-monotone. Matching markets with more risk-
averse participants, a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions, or a more
polarized distribution of applicant qualities can be more vulnerable to self-fullling early
contracting rushes. Employers can have a collective interest in preventing early oers to a
few promising applicants from starting the rushes.
Acknowledgements: An earlier version was circulated with the title \Early Contracting
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Research Council of Canada.
1. Introduction
Some markets, especially entry-level labor markets for professionals, have experienced dif-
culties in controlling the timing of interview and appointment dates. Participants on
both sides of such markets tend to arrange interviews and make oers ahead of an agreed
upon starting date, or in the absence of such a date, before important information about
ability of applicants and desirability of positions becomes available.
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But not all markets
are so vulnerable to rolling back of the appointment date. The market for freshly minted
Ph.D. economics graduates has followed the same recruitment routine of interviews at the
American Economic Association Meetings and subsequent campus visits year after year.
Even for markets that have had timing problems, some are more successful than others
in enforcing the policy of a uniform starting date. Why do these dierences exist across
markets? We believe that a model of self-enforcing multiple equilibria in early contracting
can oer some insights.
There is a good deal of evidence that supports the existence of self-enforcing multiple
equilibria in the unraveling of appointment dates. Roth and Xing (1994) refer to Wald's
(1990) description of the experience of a failed attempt to enforce a uniform appointment
date in the market for federal judicial law clerks. According to Wald, in the spring of 1989,
the District of Columbia Judicial Council adopted a resolution that committed itself to
the practice of not making oers to law clerk applicants prior to May 1 of the applicant's
second year in law school. This resolution was also adopted by the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits, but was rejected by the Fifth, Seventh, and
the Eleventh circuits. There were some variations to the adopted resolution: some made
compliance with the May 1 deadline contingent upon the compliance of other circuits;
some agreed unilaterally. Again according to Wald, as May 1, 1990 approached, \a few
judges weakened at the end and made calls ahead of the deadline. This, in turn, provoked
1
Studies of such markets have been pioneered in a series of papers by Roth and his co-authors (Roth,
1984, 1991, Mongell and Roth, 1991, Roth and Xing, 1994). One of the most recent examples of the rush
to contract early occurred the 2001 draft season of the National Basketball Association, which has gained
some negative publicity with the dominance of top draft picks by high-school graduates who skip college
basketball entirely.
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the students to call other judges they preferred before the noon deadline, so there was a
destabilizing urry of pre-deadline transactions."
In a recent paper, Avery, Jolls, Posner, and Roth (2001) argue that there are two
related diculties in enforcing a uniform deadline for oers. The rst one is the congestion
of proposals and decisions at the starting time of the deadline. This occurs because market
participations have too little time to consider more than a few choices, and the fear of losing
candidates or positions to competitors drives them to a frenzy in which oers have to be
made and accepted. The second problem in enforcing a uniform deadline is cheating by
applicants and employers who contact their favorite choices before the deadline. Avery
et al. (2001) argue that part of the reason for cheating is the anticipated congestion at
the beginning of the deadline. Since the turnaround time is short, it can be critical for
applicants and employers to know how committed their top choices are. But even if the
congestion problem is non-existent, the cheating problem can arise because of the incentives
to use early appointments to insure against risks from match outcomes in the spot market.
These incentives can be self-fullling, as illustrated by the results of two surveys conducted
by Avery et al. (2001) with the federal judges. When the judges were asked whether they
believed that their colleagues would adhere to a start-date for interviews of September 1
of the third year of law school, if the date was established by the Judicial Conference,
more than seventy percent of the responding judges stated that they did not believe all or
virtually all of their colleagues would adhere. The same surveys showed that \most judges
say they are willing to comply if others are, but the problem is that they do not believe
that most others will comply."
Incentives to sign early contracts in a competitive market can be understood in terms
of the trade-o between the insurance benets and the sorting ineciencies generated by
early contracts. Li and Rosen (1998) consider such a model in which an aggregate un-
certainty about market conditions prompts risk-averse market participants to engage in
early contracting before their productive characteristics are completely known. A unique
equilibrium is derived, in which some participants enter early matches, while others match
in the spot market after the aggregate uncertainty is resolved and their productive charac-
teristics become known. However, the model of Li and Rosen (1998) does not completely
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capture the self-fullling property of this process. The critical assumption in Li and Rosen
(1998) responsible for the uniqueness of early contracting equilibrium turns out to be that
there is no uncertainty about rms' hiring needs. When a job applicant contracts early
with an employer, the expected number of remaining applicants in the spot market falls
by less than one, because not all workers will turn out to be productive, while the number
of job positions in the spot market falls by one. Therefore an increase in early contract-
ing beyond the equilibrium level would make jobs more scarce in the spot market. Since
rms do not face uncertainty about their own hiring needs, as jobs become more scarce,
the scope for mutually benecial early contracting would decline because rms would face
little uncertainty in their spot market payo. Equilibrium in the Li and Rosen model is
therefore \self-correcting."
When there are uncertainties both about quality of applicants and about hiring needs
of employers, however, multiple equilibria can occur. There are two reasons why equilib-
ria need not be \self-correcting" in the presence of two-sided uncertainties. First, since
expected vacancies in the early market may not materialize in the spot market, an in-
crease in the extent of early contracting does not always make jobs more scarce in the spot
market. Indeed, as early contracting spreads from applicants with high expected abilities
to those who are not so promising, the residual demand for positions in the spot market
may rst fall before rising relative to supply. This means that dierent degrees of early
contracting can be consistent with the same demand-supply balance in the spot market.
Second, even when early contracting is so extensive that a further increase does make jobs
more scarce in the spot market, the result may be a greater instead of a smaller scope
of mutually benecial early contracting. This is because when employers also face uncer-
tainty regarding their hiring needs, incentives to contract early are the greatest if the spot
market is perceived to be balanced, as an imbalance in either direction reduces the chance
that an applicant and an employer can strike a deal in the early market for insurance
purpose. Non-monotonicities in these two relations can give rise to multiple early con-
tracting equilibria. As a result, market sentiment is important in understanding whether
early contracting rushes occur. If the market is calm and few participant are anticipated
to \jump the gun" by oering contracts early, then no one will have the incentive to make
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early oers. But if the market is hot and a signicant fraction of market participants are
making early contacts, others will want to follow suit and another equilibrium arises with
early matches by some participants.
Our study of multiple equilibria in early contracting rushes is potentially useful in
assessing viability of new reforms and regulations. Given that it is close to impossible
for a uniform-date policy to plug all \leaks" of early oers, some understanding of how
leaks feed themselves is important for identifying potential weak spots of the reforms and
increasing the eectiveness of preventive measures. Moreover, the existence of multiple
equilibria in our model facilitates stability analysis. An equilibrium in the early market
may be thought of as unstable if \small shocks" to market sentiment begin a self-fullling
process that leads to a new equilibriumwith more wide-spread early contracting. Matching
markets with more risk-averse participants, a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply
of positions, or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities can be more vulnerable
to self-fullling early contracting rushes. Instability of an equilibrium with a limited extent
of early contracting also helps to explain why reforms in some markets (e.g., the judicial
law clerks market) were initially successful in containing early oers before breaking down
entirely.
This paper is organized as follows. The model of early contracting is presented in
the next section. In Section 3 we show how multiple equilibria of early contracting arise,
either because participants' expectation of the balance of demand and supply in the spot
market has non-monotone eects on their decisions to contract early, or because individual
decisions to sign early contracts have non-monotone eects on the balance of demand
and supply in the spot market. Section 4 discusses stability and welfare implications of
multiple equilibria. We address the issue of when early contracting rushes are likely to
occur due to the vulnerability of the equilibrium with no early contracting, show that
multiple early contracting equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked, and compare the welfare of
dierent groups of market participants across the early contracting equilibria. Section 5
extends the analysis in the paper by allowing xed-wage early contracts and heterogeneity
on both sides of the market. The nal section summarizes the results and concludes the
paper.
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2. The Model
The setup of the model generally follows Li and Rosen (1998), with important dierences
pointed out along the way. There are two periods when pairwise contracts can be agreed
upon. In period one, both workers and rms face individual uncertainty about their
productivity. An output of 1 is produced in period two if and only if a productive worker
is matched with a productive rm; otherwise, the output is zero. In addition to individual
uncertainty, there is also some aggregate uncertainty that aects market demand and
supply in period two.
Individual uncertainty features prominently in discussions of early contracting, be-
cause it generates both insurance incentives to contract early and the cost of sorting inef-
ciency.
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We model individual uncertainty as follows. Workers are characterized by their
types . A type- worker has probability  of becoming productive in period two. Worker
type  is assumed to be continuously distributed on the support [
min
; 
max
], with distri-
bution function F and density function f . The assumption of continuous type distribution
avoids dealing with discrete distributions as in Li and Rosen (1998), and is more realistic
in markets with large number of participants on both sides. Let  be the mean type of
workers. On the other side of the market, we assume that all rms are of the same type:
each rm has probability  < 1 of becoming productive in period two. The assumption of
homogeneous rms simplies the exposition; the multiple equilibria result does not depend
on this assumption (see Section 5). Further, we assume

max
>  > 
min
:
That is, some workers in the market have higher probabilities than rms to be productive,
while others are less likely to be productive. This is impossible in the model of Li and
Rosen (1998), who assume one-sided individual uncertainty, with  = 1  
max
, and derive
2
In some markets, unraveling of the appointment date has been pushed so far back that the uncertainty
about abilities of the applicants becomes substantial. For example, in the market for federal law clerks,
with the appointment date unraveled to the middle of the second year of the three-year law program, there
is signicant uncertainty about the ability of the candidate at the time of early appointment (Avery et al.,
2001).
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a unique equilibrium. We will show later that the assumption of two-sided uncertainties
here is responsible for the multiple equilibria result in the present paper.
Let the measure of workers be 1 and the measure of rms be n, which can be either
greater than or smaller than 1. Since there is a continuum of workers and rms, in the
absence of any aggregate uncertainty about the second period spot market, when all wait
for the spot market, either for certain there will be a shortage of positions (if  > n),
or for certain there will be a shortage of applicants (if  < n). It will become clear
later that early contracts are then impossible, because either all workers, or all rms will
refuse to match early. As in Li and Rosen (1998), aggregate uncertainty is necessary for
early contracting to occur in a model with binary productivity.
3
Unlike Li and Rosen
(1998), where aggregate uncertainty is created by discreteness of type distribution, here
we introduce it through exogenous shocks to the spot market. We assume that in period
two, before rms and workers are matched, an additional net measure x of productive
rms comes into existence. This shock x is a random variable distributed continuously
on [x
min
; x
max
], with distribution function H and density function h. We allow x to be
positive or negative.
4
We assume that
x
min
<    n < x
max
:
This assumption means that starting from a situation where all participants wait for the
spot market, both workers and rms have positive probabilities of being on the short side
of the market.
Wages are assumed to be exible in both the rst period market and the second period
market. In the spot market of period two, unproductive workers and rms cannot produce
and receive 0. Due to our binary assumption, productive workers and rms receive either
nothing or all of the output, depending on the market condition. All productive workers
3
See Li and Suen (2000) and Suen (2000) for models where realized productivity is a continuous
variable. These models generate early contracting equilibrium without aggregate uncertainty.
4
We interpret a positive value of x as more new rms than new applicants entering the spot market,
but it also can result from some applicants changing their minds about applying for a position between
the rst and the second period. Similarly, a negative value of x can result from rms withdrawing from
the spot market due to unexpected economic downturns or even bankruptcy. See, for example, Roth and
Xing (1994). The results in the present paper do not depend on the interpretations.
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receive 1 and productive rms receive 0 if workers are on the short side|there are fewer
productive workers than productive rms. The opposite is true when productive rms
are on the short side. In the rst period early market, an early contract between a rm
and a worker is a promise by a rm to pay r 2 [0; 1] to the worker in period two if both
turn out to be productive, and 0 otherwise. The assumption of exible wages in both the
rst period market and the second period market suits some markets, such as the labor
market of American law rms, where salary wars have been reported in the rush to make
early oers (Roth and Xing, 1994), but is less appropriate for markets such as the one for
federal law clerks where salaries are non-negotiable. In Section 5, we adapt the analysis to
markets where wages are xed.
Finally, let u and v represent the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of work-
ers and rms, respectively. Both u and v are assumed to be weakly concave, with strict
concavity for at least one of them. For convenience, we normalize by assuming that
u(0) = v(0) = 0 and u(1) = v(1) = 1. It will be seen from the ensuing analysis that
early contracting can never occur if participants on both sides of the market are risk-
neutral. This is because in our model early contracting is the equilibrium outcome where
participants trade o the insurance benets against the sorting ineciencies. With both
sides risk-neutral, there is no insurance gain and in equilibrium all participants wait for
the spot market. However, early contracting can occur if only one side of the market is
risk-averse. Thus our analysis applies to markets where workers are averse to the risks in
the job market outcome but rms are neutral to the risks in lling their positions.
3. The Analysis
A road map for the following analysis is perhaps helpful. First, for any perceived market
condition in period two, we dene the ask price, which gives the minimum wage oer in
an early contract for workers to sign up, and the bid price, which gives the maximum
oer that rms are prepared to give to each type of worker. Second, we show how the
bid and ask prices determine a non-monotone relationship between the perceived market
condition in period two and the extent of early contracting in period one: incentives to
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contract early are the greatest when the period two market is perceived to be more or less
balanced. Third, we show that the relationship from the extent of early contracting to the
market condition can also be non-monotone: the prospect that productive workers will be
on the short side of the spot market rst rises as high types of workers form early contracts,
and then declines as early contracting spreads to lower types of workers. After dening an
equilibrium as a pair of market condition in period two and extent of early contracting in
period one that satisfy the two relationships, we show how the non-monotonicity of either
relationship can lead to multiple self-fullling early contracting equilibria.
3.1. Bid and ask prices
Incentives of the participants to engage in early contracting depend on their expectations of
the spot market condition of demand and supply. In our model with binary productivities
in the spot market, expectations are summarized by the probability that workers are on
the short side of the spot market. We denote this probability by .
A type- worker prefers early contracting to waiting if he receives r in the early
contracting market such that u(r)  . Dene the \ask price" by r
w
(), that is,
u(r
w
())  :
Note that this price is independent of worker's type . It is straightforward to verify the
following intuitive properties of the ask price function: (i) r
w
(0) = 0; (ii) r
w
(1) > 1; (iii)
r
w
() is increasing and convex in ; and (iv) r
w
() is decreasing in  for any . The rst
property follows from the normalization that u(0) = 0. The second property follows from
our assumption that  < 1. If productive workers are short for sure in the spot market,
workers of all types will demand more than the entire output for them to sign up early with
rms, to compensate for the fact that the rm's promise in an early contract is fullled
only when it turns out to be productive. A greater prospect of shortages of productive
workers in period two means that workers have to be compensated more to sign up in
period one, so r
w
is increasing in . Convexity of r
w
follows from risk-aversion of workers.
Finally, if the rms' prospect is better, then workers of any type can be satised with lower
wages in early contracts, so r
w
() is decreasing in  for any .
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Figure 1
On the other side of the market, a rm prefers early contracting with a type- worker
to waiting if the price r it pays satises v(1  r)  (1  ). Denote the \bid price" for
a -type worker by r
f
(; ). Then
v(1   r
f
(; ))  1  :
This bid price function has the following properties: (i) r
f
(0; ) < 0; (ii) r
f
(1; ) = 1; (iii)
r
f
(; ) is increasing and concave in ; and (iv) r
f
(; ) is increasing in . The rst two
properties follow from our normalization that v(1) = 1 and v(0) = 0. A greater prospect of
shortages of productive workers in period two means that rms are willing to oer higher
wages in early contracts, so r
f
is increasing in  for any . Concavity of r
f
follows from
risk-aversion of rms. Finally, for any xed , rms are willing to oer higher wages in
period one to more promising workers, so r
f
is increasing in  for any .
We sketch the ask price function and a family of the bid price functions in Figure 1. In
our model the insurance incentives to contract early are the greatest when the period two
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market is expected to be more or less balanced. As can be seen from Figure 1, concavity of
r
f
and convexity of r
w
in  imply that for any type  the dierence between the bid and the
ask prices are greater for intermediate values of  than for extreme values. If workers are
desperate for early matches because there is an expected over-supply of productive workers
in the period two market (i.e., if  is close to 0), rms' best early oers fall short of workers'
demand due to the uncertainty about workers' productivity (i.e., r
f
(; ) < r
w
() because
 < 1). Conversely, if rms are desperate because they expect to have a hard time nding
productive workers from the spot market (i.e., if  is close to 1), workers demand more
than what rms can oer in early contracts due to the uncertainty about rms' prospect
(i.e., r
w
() > r
f
(; ) for any  because  < 1).
Since r
f
is increasing in  for any , the bid price functions are ordered by worker type.
In Figure 1, if workers and rms are risk-neutral, both r
w
and r
f
would be linear. In this
case, since r
w
(0) = 0 > r
f
(0; ) and r
w
(1) > 1 = r
f
(1; ), the ask price function r
w
would
lie above even the highest bid price function r
f
for any . Early contracting is impossible
if both sides of the market are risk-neutral. If at least one side is risk-averse, the bid price
function r
f
(; ) can rise above the ask price function r
w
() for some intermediate values
of . As long as at least one side of the participants are suciently risk-averse there is a
unique worker type
^
 (not necessarily between 
min
and 
max
) such that r
f
(;
^
) is tangent
to r
w
().
5
We assume that
^
 < 
max
; otherwise, early contracting can never occur because
the ask price is higher than the bid price for any type. Then, for any  >
^
, the bid price
function r
f
(; ) crosses the ask price function r
w
() exactly twice. Let 
min
< 
max
be
the two solutions to the equation
r
f
(; 
max
) = r
w
();
5
To see the existence and uniqueness of
^
, for each  let ^() be the unique value of  at which r
w
and r
f
have the same slope: dr
w
(^)=d  @r
f
(^; )=@. Let ^() = 0 if dr
w
()=d > @r
f
(; )=@ for
all , and ^() = 1 if dr
w
()=d < @r
f
(; )=@ for all . Dene () as the distance between r
w
and r
f
at ^, that is, ()  r
w
(^())   r
f
(^(); ). By construction d()=d =  @r
f
(^(); )=@ < 0. Then,
there is a unique type
^
 such that r
f
(;
^
) is tangent to r
w
() at ^(
^
), if (i) () > 0 for  close to 0;
and (ii) () < 0 for  close to 1. The rst of the two conditions is always satised, because r
f
(; ) falls
entirely below r
w
() if  is suciently small. For any given , the second condition is satised, if either u
is suciently concave so that r
w
increases slowly with , or v is suciently concave so that r
f
increases
quickly with .
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and ^ be the tangency point of r
f
(;
^
) and r
w
(), i.e. the unique solution to the equation
r
f
(;
^
) = r
w
():
As can be seen from Figure 1, 
min
< ^ < 
max
.
3.2. Two non-monotone relationships
Early contracting is mutually benecial to a type- worker and a rm if the bid price
r
f
(; ) for type  exceeds the ask price r
w
(). Since r
f
(; ) is increasing in , the
\ordering property" holds: If rms are willing to bid for workers of type , they are also
willing to bid for workers of types higher than . Because workers' willingness to accept
early contracts is independent of their types, the ordering property implies a critical worker
type 
0
, for whom the bid price is no lower than the ask price. Workers with   
0
will
contract early while those with  < 
0
will wait.
From Figure 1, the critical type 
0
depends on perceived market conditions in period
two. We can write 
0
= l(). We dene the l function without regard to the constraint that

0
 
min
, in order to focus on the general shape of the function. The l function is sketched
in each of the two panels in Figure 2. See the lower panel for the labels corresponding to
the variables we have dened. For  < 
min
or  > 
max
, the bid price is lower than the
ask price for all , and so l() = 
max
. For any  such that l() < 
max
, by denition
r
w
() = r
f
(; l()). For  = ^, the bid price is not lower than the ask price for all  
^
,
and so l(^) =
^
. That is,
^
 is the lowest type that can sign early contracts, regardless of
the market condition. As the value of  deviates from ^ in either direction, the critical
type 
0
rises. Hence, the l function is U-shaped, attaining a minimum of
^
 at  = ^.
6
Because the bid prices are ordered by worker type, intermediate values of  imply
not only that insurance incentives for early contracting are greater for any xed worker
type, but also that insurance incentives exist for more types. This translates into the
6
The l function is dierentiable at ^, implying that l is indeed U-shaped. To see this, note that l()
is implicitly dened by r
f
(; l()) = r
w
() for both   ^ and   ^. The right-derivative of l at ^
takes the same form as the left-derivative: both are given by the ratio of dr
w
(^)=d   @r
f
(^; l(^))=@ to
@r
f
(^; l(^))=@. By denition, r
w
() and r
f
(; l(^)) are tangent at ^, and so dl(^)=d exists and is equal
to zero.
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non-monotone relationship from  to 
0
through the l function. The non-monotonicity of
the l function contrasts with the model of Li and Rosen (1998). In their model, individual
uncertainty is one-sided, with  = 1. Consequently, r
w
(1) = r
f
(1; ) = 1 for any . In this
case the bid price function r
f
(; ) for any type  always intersects the ask price function
12
rw
() at  = 1. This implies that the two functions can be tangent to each other only at
 = 1, and so ^ = 1. Thus, even though insurance gains from early contracting become
smaller for all types as  becomes closer to 1, as in the present model, the gains become
available to more types at the same time. As a result, l() is monotonically decreasing in
: the greater is , the more worker types that can strike an early deal with rms.
In an early contracting equilibrium, both  and 
0
are endogenously determined.
Having considered how  aects 
0
, we now characterize how 
0
aects  in the period
two market. Denote this function as p(
0
). Since all workers with  < 
0
stay in the
period two market, the measure of productive workers in period two is
R

0

min
f()d. The
measure of productive rms, on the other hand, is (n   (1   F (
0
))) + x. Dene the
excess supply of workers before the shock x is realized as
e(
0
) =
Z

0

min
f()d   (n  (1  F (
0
))):
Then the probability that workers are on the short side of the market is equal to
p(
0
) =
8
>
<
>
:
0; if e(
0
)  x
max
;
1 H(e(
0
)); if x
min
< e(
0
) < x
max
;
1; if e(
0
)  x
min
.
The assumption that x
min
<   n < x
max
implies that p(
0
) is strictly between 0 and 1
at least for 
0
close to 
max
. For any such 
0
, the derivative of the function p with respect
to 
0
is
 h(e(
0
))f(
0
)(
0
  ):
Since early contracting satises the ordering property, our assumption that 
max
<  <

min
implies that initially when workers who sign early contracts have higher probabilities
of becoming productive than do rms, the signing of more workers increases the chance
that productive workers will be short in the spot market. That is, p(
0
) increases as 
0
decreases from 
max
. See the upper panel of Figure 2. However, if aggregate uncertainty
still exists when the prospects of the threshold worker type 
0
drop to the level of rms
(i.e., if x
min
< e() < x
max
), then p(
0
) starts to decrease as 
0
falls below . This
is the case depicted in the lower panel of Figure 2. In this case  is relatively high, so
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eventually as the last workers who sign early contracts have lower probabilities of becoming
productive than do rms, the signing of more workers reduces the chance that productive
workers will be on the short side.
The potentially non-monotone property of the p function depends critically on the
assumption of  < 
max
. If  = 1, as in Li and Rosen (1998), the above derivation of p
shows that the function is monotonically increasing for any 
0
. Intuitively, in this case
the rst-order impact of more early contracts is that rms become more scarce in the
spot market, so that the probability  of workers being short in period two monotonically
declines as more early matches are made.
3.3. Incomplete and complete early contracting
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the probability  that productive workers are short
in period two and the threshold 
0
of worker types that enter early matches are determined
endogenously and are consistent with each other.
7
An early contracting equilibrium can
be naturally dened by a pair of variables  and 
0
that satisfy the two relationships:

0
= l() and  = p(
0
). In such an equilibrium, the extent of early contracting is
endogenously limited by the insurance gains from early contracting. However, it is possible
that the extent of early contracting is exogenously limited by the period one market size.
For example, it can happen that the insurance gains from early contracting still exist when
all rms have entered early matches. We distinguish two types of equilibria according to
whether the extent of early contracting is limited by insurance gains or by the market size.
Definition 3.1. An incomplete early contracting equilibrium is a pair (

; 

0
), with


0
> 
min
and 1  F (

0
) < n, such that 

= p(

0
), and 

0
= l(

).
An incomplete equilibrium is an intersection of the two functions l() and p(
0
),
provided that the extent of early contracting does not exceed the size of the early market.
Given 

, worker type 

0
is the last one for whom the bid price exceeds the ask price, so all
insurance gains from early contracting are exhausted. Early contracting is incomplete in
7
For discussions of formal denition of early contracting equilibrium, see Li and Rosen (1998) and Li
and Suen (2000).
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this type of equilibria in that not all rms and not all workers contract in the early market.
Since rms are identical, an incomplete equilibrium with 

0
< 
max
is associated with a
schedule of early wage oers r

(), for  2 [

0
; 
max
], such that all rms are indierent
between waiting for the spot market and signing early contracts with any worker of type
 2 [

0
; 
max
]. This wage oer schedule is then given by:
r

() = r
f
(

; );
for all  2 [

0
; 
max
]. In an incomplete equilibrium with identical rms, all insurance
benets from early matches are captured by workers. Among workers who enter early
matches, higher types benet more from early contracting than lower types do.
In the second type of early contracting equilibria, called \complete" early contracting
equilibrium, either all workers or all rms enter early matches in period one. Take the case
of all-worker complete equilibrium. This can happen only if n > 1 so there are more rms
than workers in the period one market. Since
^
 is the lowest type that can enter early
matches, a complete early contracting equilibrium with all workers entering early matches
can occur only if 
min
>
^
. Similarly, an all-rm complete early contracting equilibrium
can occur only if there are more workers with type higher than
^
 than rms in period one,
i.e., if 
n
>
^
, where 
n
satises
n = 1  F (
n
):
We have the following denition.
Definition 3.2. An all-worker complete early contracting equilibrium is a pair (

; 
min
)
such that 

= 1  H(e(
min
)) and l(

) < 
min
. An all-rm complete early contracting
equilibrium is a pair (

; 
n
) such that 

= 1 H(e(
n
)) and l(

) < 
n
.
A complete equilibrium corresponds to the point (

; 
min
) or (

; 
n
) on the p(
0
)
function, provided it lies \above" the point (

; l(

))) on the l() function. In such an
equilibrium, insurance gains from early contracting still exist after the limit of the period
one market is reached on the workers' side or on the rms' side. In an all-worker complete
equilibrium, since not all rms enter early matches, the early wage schedule is determined
in the same way as in an incomplete equilibrium, with all insurance benets going to
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the workers. In an all-rm complete equilibrium, in contrast, because there is a shortage
of rms in the period one market, all insurance benets from early contracting with the
critical type 
n
go to the rms they are matched with. Since all rms are identical, they are
indierent between signing with the critical type at the ask price r
w
(

) and signing with
types higher than 
n
. Thus, the equilibrium early wage schedule r

(), for  2 [
n
; 
max
],
is given by
v(1  r

()) = 
n
v(1  r
w
(

)):
For all types higher than 
n
, the insurance benets from early contracting are split between
workers and the rms they are matched with.
3.4. Multiple equilibria
Early contracting equilibria are graphically displayed in Figure 2. The upper panel of
Figure 2 shows the case in which
^
 > , and the lower panel shows the case for
^
 < .
Consider rst incomplete early contracting equilibria, which correspond to the intersections
of p(
0
) and l(). In each panel of Figure 2, we illustrate a case of multiple equilibria.
The diagram is not meant to include all possibilities of how the two functions l and p
can intersect each other; a complete catalogue of the possibilities is tedious and not very
illuminating. Instead, we use the two panels to illustrate two dierent reasons for multiple
equilibria. In the upper panel, multiple equilibria arise because of the U-shaped l()
function. In the lower panel, multiple equilibria arise because the function p(
0
) is non-
monotone.
8
A complete equilibrium arises when the extent of early contracting reaches the limit of
the early market before the insurance benets are exhausted. For a given set of parameters,
there can be at most one complete early contracting equilibrium, but it can coexist with
incomplete equilibria. Consider the upper panel of Figure 2, for example. Let the three
intersections of l() and p(
0
) be (
1
; 
1
), (
2
; 
2
), and (
3
; 
3
), in the order of increasing
values of . When n > 1 it can happen that 
min
lies between 
2
and 
3
. Then, at
8
If p(
0
) is monotonically increasing, as in Li and Rosen (1998), there would be a single intersection
with the l() function.
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0
= 
min
and the corresponding  = p(
min
), after all workers have entered early matches
in period one, there are still rms that are willing to contract early provided more workers
were available, because l(p(
min
)) < 
min
. This is an all-worker complete early contracting
equilibrium. On the other hand, when n < 1, 
n
may lie between 
2
and 
3
. At the point
(p(
n
); 
n
) on the p(
0
) curve, after all rms have entered early matches with workers
of type 
n
and higher, there are still workers who are willing to enter early matches
provided more rms were available, because l(p(
n
)) < 
n
. This is an all-rm complete
early contracting equilibrium. In either case, (
3
; 
3
) is no longer an equilibrium.
9
The
following proposition summarizes our discussion.
Proposition 3.3. Multiple early contracting equilibria can arise because l() is non-
monotone, or because p(
0
) is non-monotone.
In Li and Rosen (1998), early contracting equilibrium is unique. The present paper
makes two dierent assumptions. First, rms as well as workers face individual uncer-
tainty:  < 1 in the present paper, whereas  = 1 in Li and Rosen. Second, types of
workers are distributed continuously and aggregate uncertainty about the spot market is
introduced through newcomers in the spot market, rather than through discrete type dis-
tribution of workers. As we have explained earlier, the rst dierence alone is responsible
for generating multiple equilibria in the early market. It renders both the l function and
the p function non-monotone. If  = 1, as in Li and Rosen (1998), we would have a
downward sloping function l() and an upward sloping p(
0
) in Figure 2. In that case, if
there is an intersection of the two functions, it will be unique.
Therefore, the assumption that rms also face individual uncertainty potentially gen-
erates multiple early contracting equilibria in two ways. The economic meanings of non-
monotonicity of the two functions l and p are dierent. Non-monotonicity of the function l
captures the idea that uncertainty about the spot market, and hence the insurance benets
from early contracting, is the greatest when the spot market is neither too tight nor too
9
If 
min
or 
n
is between 
max
and 
2
, the point (p(
min
); 
min
), or (p(
n
); 
n
) on the p(
0
) curve
does not correspond to a complete equilibrium because it lies below the corresponding point on the l
function. In this case, the only early contracting equilibrium is (
1
; 
1
).
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slack. A U-shaped p function captures the idea that the feedback eect of early contracting
on the spot market is not monotone: as more participants sign early, the probability that
productive workers will be short in the spot market rst goes up because those who sign
early are on more likely to be more productive than rms, but eventually goes down as
workers who are less promising also sign up early.
4. Stability and Welfare Implications
Existence of multiple early contracting equilibria is more than a theoretical possibility in
the class of matching models where risk-sharing motivates participants to contract early
without adequate information about each other. In this section we introduce stability
analysis to further understanding of cross-market dierences in terms of how vulnerable
they are to early contracting rushes. We also provide welfare comparisons of dierent
groups of market participants across the equilibria that can help explain observed eorts
in some matching markets to regulate timing of oers.
4.1. Stability and vulnerability
Borrowing from the standard pseudo-dynamic stability analysis (Henderson and Quandt,
1980), stability of an equilibrium (

; 

0
) depends on the relative slopes of the functions l
and p. If the l function is (locally) downward sloping and the p function is (locally) upward
sloping (see Figure 2, for example), this could lead to \cobweb" type of dynamics as in
demand-supply analysis. This kind of analysis implicitly assumes that out-of-equilibrium
 and 
0
take turns to adjust, and the resulting dynamics in terms of 
0
is non-monotone.
In our setup, however, workers are heterogeneous and their incentives to contract early
are ordered by types. So it makes sense to consider the kind of pseudo-dynamics where
market participants make sequential decisions in an orderly fashion and out-of-equilibrium
adjustments are monotone in terms of 
0
.
10
We therefore adopt a stability analysis which
10
The stability denition introduced below is based on our assumption of heterogeneous worker order-
ing property. If workers are homogeneous, equilibrium can still be dened by an intersection of the l and
p functions, except that 
0
now represents the fraction of workers that contract early. The l function is
locally constant and the p function is always monotone, implying that there will be a unique equilibrium
and that it is stable according to both the standard cobweb dynamics and our denition below. In this
case there is no advantage in using our denition, but then the uniqueness of equilibrium makes stability
an uninteresting issue.
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amounts to assuming instantaneous adjustments of : as 
0
gradually moves from the
starting point in the direction of l(p(
0
)),  adjusts to keep pace with changes in 
0
by
staying on the p function. This assumption reduces a two-dimensional dynamic adjustment
problem to a one-dimensional problem, and ensures that the direction of adjustment in
terms of 
0
is always monotone regardless of the slopes of l and p functions. Formally, we
introduce the following denition.
Definition 4.1. An incomplete early contracting equilibrium with 

0
is stable if there is
a neighborhood around 

0
such that for any 
0
in the neighborhood, 
0
< 

0
implies that
l(p(
0
)) > 
0
and 
0
> 

0
implies that l(p(
0
)) < 
0
.
The above denition leads to the following characterization in terms of slopes of l and
p functions around 

0
. Take the linear approximation of the combined function l(p(
0
))
around 

0
, we have
l(p(
0
)) = 

0
+ l
0
(

)p
0
(

0
)(
0
  

0
):
Then our denition of stability amounts to the condition that
l
0
(

)p
0
(

0
) < 1:
It follows that if one of the two functions l and p is downward sloping and the other is
upward sloping, then the intersection 

0
is always stable. Furthermore, if both functions
are downward sloping or upward sloping, then 

0
is stable if and only if p is steeper
than l in the -
0
diagram. In other words, an intersection is stable if and only if the
p(
0
) function intersects the l() function from above.
11
Note that under the standard
cobweb-dynamics, 

0
is stable if and only if jl
0
p
0
j < 1. Thus our adopted stability concept
is weaker. In particular, it imposes no restrictions on the slopes when one of the two
functions is downward sloping and the other is upward sloping.
One implication of our denition of stability is that the unique equilibrium constructed
by Li and Rosen (1998) is stable by our denition, because the l function is downward
11
It is straightforward to show that in a generic situation, the number of equilibria is nite and odd,
which implies existence. Moreover, if we rank the equilibria in increasing order of 
0
, then the equilibria
are alternatively stable and unstable.
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sloping and the p function is upward sloping. Note also that whenever no early contracting
is an equilibrium, with 

0
= 
max
, it is also stable by our denition because the l function
is at at such an equilibrium. See Figure 2.
Thus far, we have considered only incomplete early contracting equilibria. But the
same denition of stability applies to complete early contracting equilibria as well. Since
by denition a complete equilibrium contracting corresponds to a point on the p(
0
) func-
tion that is above the l(
0
) function, any such equilibrium is stable. A complete early
contracting equilibrium is always reached monotonically as more and more workers enter
early matches with rms. The result that any complete equilibrium is stable is reassuring
and adds to the attraction to our concept of stability.
Our model of multiple early contracting equilibria shares some similarities with the
bank runs model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Multiplicity of equilibria arises in sit-
uations where coordination is important such as in models of bank runs, because actions
by agents can be self-fullling. In our model, workers have dierent characteristics in the
rst period. Multiple equilibria arise not from coordination but from the non-monotone
eects of early contracting by some agents on the insurance benets from early contracting
for the remaining agents (non-monotonicity of the l function), or from the non-monotone
feedback eects of early contracting on the spot market (non-monotonicity of the p func-
tion).
12
Despite the dierences, our stability concept allows us to consider comparative
statics issues in a similar spirit as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Consider again the
case of  <
^
 shown in the upper panel of Figure 2, where (
1
; 
1
) and (
3
; 
3
) are stable,
but (
2
; 
2
) is not. We are concerned with the transition from (
1
; 
1
) to (
3
; 
3
). In
our model, we can tell the following \big push" story. Since (
1
; 
1
) is stable and (
2
; 
2
)
is not, it takes a portion of the participants to sign early contracts for the equilibrium
to switch from (
1
; 
1
) to (
3
; 
3
). The closer is 
2
to 
1
, the more \vulnerable" is the
12
There is a recent literature that attempts to reduce multiple equilibria to a unique equilibrium
by introducing small individual heterogeneity. Examples of such works include Postlewaite and Xavier
(1986), and Morris and Shin (1998). The idea of this literature is that when agents do not have common
knowledge about the fundamental variables of the environment and instead choose their actions based on
independent signals about these variables, the self-fullling property may fail. So far this literature has
assumed that the agents are homogeneous except for the signals they receive.
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market to early contracting rushes. Moderate levels of anxiety in the market can create
self-sustaining momentum of early contracting.
What characteristics of the market make an early contracting rush more likely? In the
upper panel of Figure 2, we can see that whether 
2
is close to 
1
depends on the position
and shape of both the l and the p functions. If 
min
is smaller so that the l function starts
to decrease for small values of , or if l decreases fast for small values of , then 
2
is closer
to 
1
. From Figure 1, we nd that these conditions obtain if the insurance gains from early
contracting are large for promising worker types, which in turn occurs if workers and rms
are highly risk-averse, if many workers are highly promising, or if the prospect of the rms
is good. The position and shape of p also matter. If the p function shifts to the right, or
if p increases fast for small values of 
0
(as the critical worker type 
0
decreases), then 
2
is closer to 
1
. From the denition of p, an overall decrease in qualities of workers or an
increase in rms' prospect  will increase the probability that qualied workers are short in
the spot market for any 
0
, and cause p to shift to the right. On the other hand, recall that
the derivative of the function p with respect to 
0
is  h(e(
0
))f(
0
)(
0
 ). So p increases
fast as the critical worker type 
0
decreases from 
1
, if the density h is great for values of
shock x around   n, the density f is great for promising worker types, or the prospect
of the rms  is low. The eect of  is therefore ambiguous, but the following factors
unambiguously contribute to vulnerability of the market: highly risk-averse workers and
rms, a polarized distribution of worker qualities (i.e., a great number of highly promising
workers for a xed average quality ), and signicant aggregate uncertainty concentrated
around the initial stages of early contracting.
The above analyses of stability and comparative statics may be used to understand
cross-market dierences in the extent of early contracting. Part of the reason that the
market for Ph.D. economics graduates has been fairly immune to early oers may be
the absence of a signicant number of highly promising candidates that have established
themselves early in the Ph.D. programs. A few early \superstars" in each recruitment
season are not sucient to generate the kind of self-fullling competitive process that
spreads to any signicant portion of the market. In contrast, if markets such as the one
for legal clerks are characterized by relative homogeneity and concentration of applicants
21
near the top of the ranking, our analysis suggests that the situation of no early oers can
be an equilibrium but it can be vulnerable to the market sentiment because it is close to
an unstable equilibrium. For the same reason, reforms in such markets may be initially
successful in containing early oers if they lead to an equilibrium situation, but can unravel
quickly if the equilibrium itself is vulnerable to early contracting rushes.
4.2. Welfare analysis
Reforms and other concerted eorts in controlling the practice of early contracting in some
markets raise the theoretical issue concerning the welfare implications of early contracting.
Questions about the welfare eects of banning the practice of early contracting have been
addressed in Li and Rosen (1998) and Li and Suen (2000). The present model shares the
basic welfare trade-o in the two earlier papers: early contracting increases the chance of
mismatch, but provides insurance gains to risk-averse agents. Existence of multiple early
contracting equilibria, however, poses new questions for welfare analysis: Can equilibria be
Pareto-ranked? If not, how do the two sides of the market fare in the dierent equilibria?
Consider rst incomplete early contracting equilibria (including equilibria where there
is no early contracting). Compare two such equilibria with dierent spot market tightness


. Since rms are identical and not all rms can successfully enter early matches, early
wage oers adjust to ensure that all rms are indierent between waiting for the spot
market and making early deals with workers above the threshold type. This implies that
all rms are worse o in the incomplete early contracting equilibriumwith a greater 

. For
workers who are below the critical type in both equilibria and who wait for the spot market,
their equilibrium payo is higher in the equilibrium with a greater 

. For workers who are
above the critical type in both equilibria and who sign early contracts, the equilibrium early
wage oer schedule r

() shifts up with 

, so they are also better o in the equilibrium
with a greater 

. Finally, for workers who switch from waiting in one equilibrium to
early contracting in the other, the welfare comparison depends on whether the equilibrium
with more extensive early contracting (lower critical worker type 
0
) has a greater 

.
Suppose that the equilibrium with more early contracting has a higher 

(see the upper
panel of Figure 2). Then workers who switch from waiting to early contracting become
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better o, because their waiting option becomes more attractive and they capture the
insurance benets from early contracting. Note that in this case, all workers agree on
the preference between the two equilibria and they all have the opposite preference as the
rms. In the other case, the equilibrium with more early contracting may have a lower 

(this can happen in the lower panel of Figure 2 if the p function moves suciently to the
right.) Then, among the workers who switch from waiting to early contracting, the lower
types tend to be worse o because their waiting option becomes less attractive and the
insurance benets from early contracting for these types are small. The higher types tend
to be better o in spite of lower payos from their waiting option, because they are able
to capture more insurance benets from early contracting.
Welfare implications of complete early contracting equilibria can be similarly ad-
dressed, depending on whether complete early contracting increases or decreases the spot
market tightness 

. If more early contracting increases 

(the function p decreases for
the relevant values of 
0
), then it hurts rms and benets all workers. This is the case
when workers have promising prospects in the early market ( is high relative to ), so that
more early contracting means that many promising workers enter early matches, which re-
duces the relative demand for jobs in the spot market. If more early contracting decreases


(the function p increases for the relevant values of 
0
), then it benets all rms and
possibly some of the workers but hurts most of the latter. This is the case when rms are
relatively more promising ( is high relative to ) or when early contracting is extensive.
When more workers of relatively low types enter early matches, the demand for jobs rela-
tive to the supply of positions becomes greater in the subsequent period. This bids down
the early wage oers, hurting most of the workers while beneting all rms.
The above welfare analysis implies that rms have a collective interest in limiting the
extent of early contracting when early oers are mainly going to the applicants that show
greater promises than rms. This is consistent with the evidence documented in the works
by Alvin Roth and his co-authors (Mongell and Roth, 1991; Roth, 1991; Roth and Xing,
1994) that in many market it is often the rms that initiate reforms to control the timing
of oers. In this sense, our result resolves the puzzling conclusion in Li and Rosen (1998)
that banning early contracting should hurt all rms. Li and Rosen's (1998) conclusion
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arises from the assumption of one-sided individual uncertainty: with  equal to 1 and
greater than any , a smaller 
0
always leads to a smaller  and therefore makes rms
better o. This counter factual conclusion is avoided in our model. The assumption that
 < 
max
implies that, at least initially, more extensive early contracting increases the
chance that productive workers will be on the short side of the spot market, and therefore
is not benecial to rms.
5. Extensions
In this section we extend the multiple equilibria result in two directions. First, we allow
wages to be rigid in either the early market of period one or the spot market of period two.
Second, we allow rms as well as workers to be heterogeneous in having dierent prospects
of becoming productive. These two extensions demonstrate that our multiple equilibria
result is largely robust, and that our theoretical framework is quite versatile.
5.1. Fixed-wage contracts
We have assumed that wages are competitively determined in both the early market and
the spot market. In this section we discuss two situations of xed-wage contracts: wage
rigidity in the early market, and wage rigidity in the spot market. The rst situation may
arise when participants attempt to regulate the market, as it can be easier to control the
terms of contracts than to control the timing of oers. The second situation may arise
when rms try to use incentives such as signing bonuses in early oers in a market where
wages in the spot market are xed. For simplicity, we consider only incomplete early
contracting equilibria.
With wage rigidity in the early market only, equilibrium in the spot market continues
to be determined by which side of the market turns out to be on the short side. With
probability  productive workers are short and receive 1, and with probability 1   they
are long and receive 0. Unproductive workers and rms always receive 0. Let s be the
xed share received by workers in early contracts, regardless of type. The rms' share is
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1  s. Given any , early contracting is benecial between a rm and a type- if
u(s)  ;
v(1   s)  1  :
With xed wage s in the early contracts, the ordering property continues to hold: if early
contracting is benecial for type  workers, then it is also benecial for workers of higher
types.
As before, let l() be the function that denes the cuto worker type as a function
of . This function diers from what we dened in Section 3 because the wage oer s is
now xed in the early market. To derive l(), let 
s
and 
s
be the points of  where the
constant function r = s intersects the highest bid price function r
f
(; 
max
) and the ask
price function r
w
(), respectively. That is,
r
f
(
s
; 
max
) = s;
r
w
(
s
) = s:
Refer to Figure 1. In words, 
s
and 
s
are, respectively, the lowest and the highest value
of  that allows early contracts at s between rms and some type of workers. We assume
that
r
w
(
min
) < s < r
w
(
max
);
so that 
s
< 
s
; otherwise, early contracting at s is impossible. Then, the l function is
given by:
l()
(
= 
max
; if  < 
s
or  > 
s
;
satises r
f
(; l()) = s; if 
s
   
s
.
Thus, wage rigidity in the early market reduces the potential extent of early contracting.
Compared to the l function dened in Section 3, we see that [
s
; 
s
]  [
min
; 
max
]. Even
though gains from insurance exist for any  2 [
min
; 
max
], the xed wage s can be either
higher than the bid price for type 
max
worker (when  < 
s
), or lower than the ask price
of all workers (when  > 
s
). Moreover, for  2 [
s
; 
s
], because r
f
is increasing in both of
its two arguments, the cuto worker type l() is a decreasing function of  in this range: a
higher  implies more participants signing early contracts. Finally, there is a discontinuity
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of the l function at the point of  = 
s
: the extent of early contracting drops from the
maximum to zero.
With the function l redened as above, early contracting equilibria can be identied
in the same way as before, as intersections between the l function and the p function. As
we have seen, the l function is monotonic non-increasing (except for a point of upward
discontinuity at  = 
s
). Nevertheless the p function remains the same as in Section 3 and
can be non-monotone in 
0
. This means that multiple early contracting equilibria can still
occur because of the feedback eect of early contracting on the subsequent spot market
condition.
Now suppose that wage rigidity exists only in the spot market. Let s be the xed
share received by a productive worker, and 1   s the share received by the worker's pro-
ductive matching partner. Unproductive workers and rms get nothing. Since wages are
xed, market-clearing in the spot market requires a rationing mechanism. Consider the
following random matching mechanism. If productive workers are short, then all these
workers receive s with probability 1 and productive rms receive 1  s with a probability
equal to the ratio of the measure of productive workers to productive rms. If productive
workers are long, then all productive rms receive 1  s with probability 1 and productive
workers receive s with a probability equal to the ratio of the measure of productive rms
to productive workers. Let  be the probability in period one that productive workers
receive utility u(s) in the spot market, and  the probability that productive rms receive
utility v(1   s). Given  and , early contracting is benecial for a rm and a type 
worker if there exists an early contract share r such that
u(r)  u(s);
v(1  r)  v(1  s):
With xed wage s in the spot contracts, the ordering property continues to hold. If early
contracting with type  workers is mutually benecial, so is it with workers of higher types
as well. Therefore, if 
0
represents the cuto worker type, we have
(
0
) = p(
0
) +
Z
e(
0
)
x
min
(n   (1  F (
0
))+ x
R

0

min
f()d
dH(x);
(
0
) = 1  p(
0
) +
Z
x
max
e(
0
)
R

0

min
f()d
(n   (1   F (
0
)) + x
dH(x);
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where e(
0
) is the excess supply of workers before the shock x is realized, and p(
0
) is the
probability that productive workers will be short in period two, as dened in Section 3.
An early contracting equilibrium with wage rigidity in the spot market is then given
by a cuto worker type 
0
and the corresponding early wage oer r
0
such that
u(r
0
) = (
0
)u(s);

0
v(1  r
0
) = (
0
)v(1  s):
Compare the above two equations with the case of exible wage contracts in Section 3. For
any cuto worker type 
0
, we have (
0
) > p(
0
) and (
0
) > 1   p(
0
). On one hand,
wage rigidity in the spot market means that the downside of waiting to nd a match in
the spot market becomes less grim for both workers and rms, because being on the long
side of the spot market is no longer associated with a zero payo. This tends to reduce the
insurance benets of early contracts and make early oers less likely. On the other hand,
since u(s) < 1 and v(1  s) < 1, the upside of waiting to nd a match in the spot market
becomes less attractive as well. This has the opposite eect of encouraging participants
to sign early contracts. Which of the two eects dominates depends on the xed wage
oer s. For extreme wage shares (s is close to 0 or 1), wage rigidity in the spot market
discourages early oers and makes multiple equilibria less likely by reducing the bid prices
too low or by raising the ask price too high. For more even shares (u(s) is about the same
as v(1   s)), wage rigidity in the spot market can encourage early contract, and this is
more likely to occur if both workers and rms are highly risk-averse.
5.2. Heterogeneous rms
To allow dierent types of rms, suppose that  is distributed on [
min
; 
max
], with distri-
bution function G and density g. We consider only incomplete early contracting equilibria,
where some workers and rms wait for the spot market in the second period. The ask price
r
w
of a worker is now a function of the type of the matched rm. Let us write it as r
w
(; ).
Clearly, r
w
decreases with . The bid price function r
f
(; ) is dened as before, which is
an increasing function of  for any . It follows that for any , and any  < 
0
and  < 
0
,
if r
f
(; )  r
w
(; ) then r
f
(; 
0
)  r
w
(; 
0
). Thus, the ordering property continues to
hold with heterogeneous rms.
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Given any probability  that productive workers are short in the spot market, let 
0
be the lowest type of workers and 
0
be the lowest type of rms which sign early contracts.
The ordering property implies that for any , there can be at most one pair, 
0
and 
0
,
which satises
r
f
(; 
0
) = r
w
(; 
0
);
1  F (
0
) = n(1  G(
0
)):
The rst condition says that given , the ask price of type-
0
workers and the bid price of
type-
0
rms are equal, and the second condition says that the measure of worker types
higher than 
0
and the measure of rm types higher than 
0
are equal.
13
Dene the
function 
0
= l() such that the pair (l(); 
0
) solves the above two equations for any .
We now show that the two reasons for having multiple early contracting equilibria are
preserved in the case of heterogeneous rms. First we characterize the dependence of the
critical types 
0
and 
0
on . From the two above conditions that dene 
0
and 
0
, it is
straightforward to show that dl=d has the same sign as
@r
w
(; 
0
)
@
 
@r
f
(; 
0
)
@
:
Let a unique pair of
^
 and ^ be such that r
w
(; ^) is tangent to r
f
(;
^
), and 1  F (
^
) =
n(1   G(^)), and denote ^ as the unique value of  at which the tangency occurs. Since
r
w
is convex in  and r
f
is concave in , we have dl=d > 0 if  > ^, and dl=d < 0 if
 < ^. Therefore, as in the case of homogeneous rms, the function l() has the same
shape as in Figure 2 (
min
and 
max
are now the two intersections of r
w
(; 
max
) and
r
f
(; 
max
).) We obtain non-monotonicity of the l() function for the same reason as in
the case of homogeneous rms. The uncertainty about the spot market, and hence the
insurance benets from early contracting, is the greatest when the spot market is neither
too tight nor too slack.
13
The ordering property implies not only that early contracting involves only workers and rms above
their respective critical types, but also that these workers and rms are matched \positive assortatively,"
i.e., highest type worker with highest type rm, and so on (Becker, 1981). Using positive assortative
matching, we can determine the equilibrium schedule r() of early wage oers, which is not necessary for
our purpose of demonstrating the existence of multiple equilibria. The ordering property distinguishes the
present model from Li and Suen (2000), and Suen (2000), where both rms and workers are heterogeneous
and early contracting is not necessarily positive-assortative. This dierence arises because in the present
paper the market participants will be either productive or unproductive, so the trade-o between early
contracting and waiting does not depend on their characteristics.
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Next, we characterize the feedback eect of early contracting on . Given any critical
worker type 
0
and corresponding type 
0
of rms, the measure of productive workers in
period two is
R

0

min
f()d, while the measure of productive rms is n
R

0

min
g()d+ x.
Therefore, the probability that productive workers are on the short side of the market is
equal to p(
0
) = 1 H(e(
0
)), where
e(
0
) =
 
Z

0

min
f()d   n
Z

0

min
g()d
!
:
Using 1  F (
0
) = n(1  G(
0
)), we nd that
dp(
0
)
d
0
=  h(e(
0
))f(
0
)(
0
  
0
):
Thus, p(
0
) is decreasing for 
0
> 
0
and is increasing for 
0
< 
0
. The feedback eect
of early contracting on  is similar to the case of homogeneous rms, with 
0
replacing
the constant . Non-monotonicity of the p(
0
) function can arise under a variety of
assumptions on the distributions F and G. The intuition is the same as before. If workers
who sign early contracts have high probabilities of becoming productive relative to the rms
they are matched with, then more early matches imply a greater chance that productive
workers will be short in the spot market. Conversely, if the last workers in early matching
have low probabilities of becoming productive relative to the rms they are matched with,
then more early contracting reduces the chance that productive workers will be on the
short side.
6. Conclusion
In labor markets for entry-level professionals and in other related markets, job applicants'
concern for availability of positions and employers' concern for availability of qualied
applicants can drive some participants on the two sides to sign early job contracts before
qualications of applicants are ascertained and employers' hiring needs are conrmed. In a
two-period model with these individual uncertainties and an aggregate uncertainty about
the balance of demand and supply in the second period market, we show that multiple
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equilibria of early contracting can arise, because participants' expectation of the balance
of demand and supply in the spot market has non-monotone eects on their decisions to
contract early, or because individual decisions to sign early contracts have non-monotone
eects on the balance of demand and supply. Comparative statics analysis shows that
early contracting rushes are more likely to occur if workers and rms are highly risk-
averse, if the distribution of worker qualities is polarized, or if there is signicant aggregate
uncertainty concentrated around the initial stages of early contracting. We show that early
contracting equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked. More early contracting hurts rms and
benets workers when early contracting is not extensive and the workers who sign up
early are relatively promising candidates; the opposite is true when early contracting is so
extensive that even workers with not so good prospects sign up early. Much of our analysis
is shown to extend to the case of xed wage contracts in either the early market or in the
spot market, and to the case of heterogeneous rms.
References
Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner, and Alvin Roth. \The Market for
Federal Judicial Law Clerks." University of Chicago Law Review 68 (Summer
2001): 793{902.
Becker, Gary. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1981.
Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig. \Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liq-
uidity." Journal of Political Economy 91 (June 1983): 401{19.
Henderson, James M. and Richard E. Quandt. Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical
Approach, 3d. ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 1980.
Li, Hao and Sherwin Rosen. \Unraveling in Matching Markets." American Economic
Review 88 (June 1998): 371{87.
Li, Hao and Wing Suen. \Risk-sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting." Journal of Po-
litical Economy 108 (October 2000): 1058{91.
Mongell, Susan and Alvin E. Roth. \Sorority Rush as a Two-sided Matching Mechanism."
American Economic Review 81 (June 1991): 441{64.
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin. \Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fullling
Currency Attacks." American Economic Review 88 (June 1998): 587{97.
30
Postlewaite, Andrew and Xavier Vives. \Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon."
Journal of Political Economy 95 (June 1987): 485{91.
Roth, Alvin. \The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A
Case Study in Game Theory." Journal of Political Economy 92 (December 1984):
991{1016.
Roth, Alvin. \A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Mar-
kets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom."
American Economic Review 81 (June 1991): 415{40.
Roth, Alvin and Xiaolin Xing. \Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related
to the Timing of Market Transactions." American Economic Review 84 (September
1994): 992{1044.
Suen, Wing. \A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Unraveling in
Two-Sided Matching." Rand Journal of Economics 31 (Spring, 2000): 101{20.
Wald, Patricia. \Selecting Law Clerks." Michigan Law Review 89 (October 1990): 152{63.
31
